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Abstract
We show how to use automated computation of election margins to assess the number of votes that
would need to change in order to alter a parliamentary outcome for single-member preferential electorates.
In the context of increasing automation of Australian electoral processes, and accusations of deliberate
interference in elections in Europe and the USA, this work forms the basis of a rigorous statistical audit
of the parliamentary election outcome. Our example is the New South Wales Legislative Council election
of 2015, but the same process could be used for any similar parliament for which data was available, such
as the Australian House of Representatives given the proposed automatic scanning of ballots.
1 Introduction
It is obvious that the party that wins a majority of seats in a parliamentary election may not be the party
that wins a majority of votes. This has been examined extensively in the United States [Tuf73, Yan08]. In
Australian parliamentary elections, even the notion of a popular majority is poorly defined because Australian
voters rank their candidates in order of preference. But similar results occur: sometimes in practice the
Parliamentary winner is not the popular majority winner and there are even some systematic biases [Jac94].
Nevertheless it is often assumed by the public and the media that a party that wins a comfortable overall
margin will comfortably win the parliamentary election. Of course, this is not necessarily true.
In this paper we focus on computing the Parliamentary election margin: the minimal number of votes
that need to be changed, in a particular election outcome, to switch the Parliamentary winner. This may
be much less than the margin between the popular votes of the two major parties.
There are two ways that an Australian parliamentary election may be closer than it seems. First, there
may be many seats held by a very small margin. Second, even within one seat, the margin may be smaller
than it appears: Australia’s preferential voting system proceeds by iteratively eliminating candidates until
only two remain, then selecting the one with a larger total. A naive observer might think that the margin of
victory is the number of votes that need to be switched to reverse the winner in this last step (i.e. half the
difference in the final tallies)—we call this the last-round margin. However, the true margin may be much
smaller, because changing an early elimination step may cascade into a completely different elimination
order and elect a different candidate. Computing the correct margin for preferential voting is, in general, a
computationally difficult problem, but we have demonstrated an efficient solution [BSTT16].
In this paper we show how to automate both computations to compute the Parliamentary election margin.
This requires a slight modification to our previous work to compute the winning margin with respect to a
specific set of alternate winners in each seat, combined with a simple process of adding the margins in the
necessary number of seats.
∗Corresponding author.
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As an example, we use data from the 2015 NSW state election to compute exactly the margin by which
the Liberal/National coalition won. The popular margin was high—the Liberal/National coalition won 46%
of formal first-preference votes compared with 34% for the Labor parties and 10% for The Greens.1 The
coalition won 54 seats compared to Labor’s 34. We find, however, that the number of votes necessary to
switch the parliamentary outcome is less than 0.1%.
In prior work on US elections, we found that the true margin is almost always the last-round margin,
though exceptions did occur. This is also true of the NSW 2015 election where, for example, the Lismore
seat has a last-round margin of 1173, but the true margin of victory is only 209.
The source code used to compute our results is at https://github.com/michelleblom/margin-irv.
The same techniques and code could be easily applied to any parliamentary outcome for which complete
vote data was available. This sort of analysis could become standard procedure for any parliamentary election
with automated ballot scanning.
1.1 Summary of results
Of the 4.56 million votes cast in the NSW state election, it would take:
• 22,746 vote changes for the ALP/CLP to gain the 13 additional seats they need to win government
(with 47 seats),
• 16,349 vote changes for a Labor/GRN coalition to gain the 10 additional seats they need to win
government, and
• 10,398 vote changes to lose the Liberal/National coalition 8 seats and hence produce a hung parliament.
1.2 Application to auditing and accuracy testing, including Australian federal
elections
The same program could be used, whenever data was available, to check automatically whether a known
problem in an election was large enough to change the outcome. Similarly, when a known number of votes
were received over an insecure or unscrutinisable channel, this could be used to decide whether that might
have been enough to alter the outcome.
Conversely, it could be used to generate evidence that the election outcome is right.
These calculations could be used as the basis for a rigorous risk-limiting audit to confirm (or overturn) the
announced election outcome. Risk limiting audits [LS12] take an iterative random sample of the paper ballots
to check how well they reflect the announced outcome. An audit has risk-limit α if a mistaken outcome is
guaranteed to be detected with a probability of at least 1 − α. Either the audit concludes with a certain
confidence that the outcome is right, or it finds so many errors that a full manual recount is warranted. The
audit process is parameterised by the margin of victory in the election. Kroll et al. [KHF] have devised audits
for parliamentary outcomes but, like most US research, they focus on simple first-past-the-post elections in
which the margin is obvious.
This is particularly important now that the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Elec-
toral Matters has recommended automated scanning of the ballot papers [JSC17]. The overall House of
Representatives margin could be quickly calculated using our methods. Rigorous risk-limiting audits could
then be performed for each electorate, immediately after the election, in order to provide evidence that the
overall election outcome was correct.
In a time where outside influencing of elections is a constant source of news, and where more and more
elections systems involve electronic systems, either for voting or counting votes, it is critical that we have
mechanisms in place to generate evidence of accurate election results, and indeed to check what degree of
manipulation must have taken place for the election result to have been altered.
1This is from http://pastvtr.elections.nsw.gov.au/SGE2015/la/state/formal/index.htm
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Initially, all candidates remain standing (are not eliminated)
While there is more than one candidate standing
For every candidate c standing
Tally (count) the votes in which c is the highest-ranked
candidate of those standing
Eliminate the candidate with the smallest tally
The winner is the one candidate not eliminated
Figure 1: An informal definition of the IRV counting algorithm.
2 Background
2.1 Background on Australian election counting
The lower houses of parliaments in the Australian federal and state elections are the result of a number of
independent Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections for a set of single-member electorates (seats). Each seat
has a number of candidates, and each vote consists of an ordered list of the candidates for that seat.2
The tallying of votes in an IRV election proceeds by a series of rounds in which the candidate with the
lowest number of votes is eliminated (see Figure 1) with the last remaining candidate declared the winner.
All votes in an eliminated candidate’s tally are distributed to the next most-preferred (remaining) candidate
in their ranking.
Let C be the set of candidates in an IRV election B. We refer to sequences of candidates pi in list notation
(e.g., pi = [c1, c2, c3, c4]), and use such sequences to represent both votes and elimination orders. We will
often treat a sequence as the set of elements it contains. An election B is defined as a multiset3 of votes, each
vote b ∈ B a sequence of candidates in C, with no duplicates, listed in order of preference (most preferred to
least preferred). Let first(pi) denote the first candidate appearing in sequence pi (e.g., first([c2, c3]) = c2). In
each round of vote counting, there are a current set of eliminated candidates E and a current set of candidates
still standing S = C \ E . The winner cw of the election is the last standing candidate.
Each candidate c ∈ C has a tally of votes. Votes are added to this tally upon the elimination of a
candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c}, and are redistributed from this tally upon the elimination of c.
Definition 1. Tally tS(c) Given candidates S ⊆ C are still standing in an election B, the tally for candidate
c ∈ C, denoted tS(c), is defined as the number of votes b ∈ B for which c is the most-preferred candidate of
those remaining. Let pS(b) denote the sequence of candidates mentioned in b that are also in S.
tS(c) = | [b | b ∈ B, c = first(pS(b))] | (1)
Definition 2. Margin of Victory (MOV) The MOV in an election with candidates C and winner cw ∈ C,
is the smallest number of votes whose ranking must be modified (by an adversary) so that a candidate
c′ ∈ C \ {cw} is elected.
Often the last round margin (LRM) is used as a proxy for the margin of victory.
Definition 3. Last Round Margin (LRM) The last round margin of election, in which two candidates
S = {c, c′} remain with tS(c) and tS(c
′) votes in their tallies, is equal to half the difference between the
tallies of c and c′ rounded up.
LRM = ⌈
|tS(c)− tS(c
′)|
2
⌉ (2)
2Most Australian elections require all preferences to be filled in, but some allow partial lists or several equal-last candidates.
Our analysis extends to all these cases.
3A multiset allows for the inclusion of duplicate items.
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In this paper we will be interested in a more restricted version of margin of victory, which is the margin
of victory over a subset of the non-winning candidates.
Definition 4. Margin of Victory over Candidates A (MOVC) The MOVC in an election with can-
didates C and winner cw ∈ C over the alternate candidates A ⊆ C \ {cw}, is the smallest number of votes
whose ranking must be modified (by an adversary) so that a candidate c′ ∈ A is elected.
While the MOV calculates the number of votes required to be changed to alter the winner, the MOVC
calculates the number of votes required to alter the winner to one of a set A. We will require this finer
information in order to calculate the smallest number of votes for a different party or coalition to win the
election.
Example 1. Consider an election between 3 candidates a, b, and c with election {a : 55, ca : 25, bc : 41, c : 15}.
The initial tallies for the candidates are {a : 55, b : 41, c : 40} hence c is eliminated. The resulting votes are
then {a : 80, b : 41} and with tallies {a : 80, b : 41} giving a the victory with a last round margin of victory
of 20. But consider changing 1 vote from bc to c. Then the initial tallies are {a : 55, b : 40, c : 41} and b is
eliminated. The resulting votes are {a : 55, ca : 25, c : 56}. Then c is the winner of the election. Clearly the
MOV is 1 vote. The MOVC for {b} is 10, which is achieved by changing 5 votes from a to bc and 5 from
a to c giving first round tallies {a : 45, b : 46, c : 45} where an adversary can choose to eliminate a leaving
votes {ca : 25, bc : 46, c : 20} with tallies {b : 46, c : 45} and b winning the election.
2.2 Automated margin computation for an IRV election
(author?) [BSTT16] present a branch-and-bound algorithm (denoted margin-irv) for efficiently computing
the margin of victory in an IRV election. This algorithm improves upon an existing method by (author?)
[MRSW11]. Given an IRV election with winning candidate cw, this algorithm traverses a tree defining all
possible alternate orders of candidate elimination (that result in a candidate other than cw winning the
election). As the algorithm explores these alternate elimination sequences, it solves a linear program (LP)
to determine the minimum number of vote manipulations required to realise each elimination order. The
ultimate goal is to find an elimination sequence, in which an alternate winner is elected, that requires the
smallest number of vote changes to realise. Searching through the entire space of alternate elimination
sequences would be too combinatorially complex, however, and so margin-irv incorporates rules for pruning
sections of this tree from consideration. The result is an efficient algorithm for computing electoral margins.
Given an IRV election with candidates C and winner cw ∈ C, the margin-irv algorithm starts by adding
|C|− 1 partial elimination sequences to the search tree, one for each of alternate winner c′w ∈ C \{cw}. These
partial sequences form a frontier F . Each of these sequences contains a single candidate – the alternate
winner in question. Following the basic structure of a branch-and-bound algorithm, we compute, for each
partial sequence pi ∈ F , a lower bound on the number of vote changes required to realise a elimination
sequence that ends in pi. These lower bounds are used to guide construction of the search tree. The partial
sequence pi with the smallest lower bound is selected and expanded. For each candidate c ∈ C that is not
already present in pi, we create a new sequence with c appended to the front. For example, given a set of
candidates c1, c2, and c3, with winning candidate c3, the partial sequence pi = [c2] will be expanded to create
two new sequences [c1, c2] and [c3, c2]. We evaluate each new sequence pi
′ created by assigning it a lower
bound on the number of votes required to realise any elimination order ending in pi′.
While exploring and building elimination sequences, margin-irv maintains a running upper bound on the
value of the true margin. This upper bound is initialised to the last round margin of the election. When a
sequence pi containing all candidates is constructed, our LP computes the exact number of vote manipulations
required to realise it. If this number is lower than our current upper bound, the upper bound is revised,
and all orders on our frontier with a lower bound greater than or equal to it are pruned from consideration
(removed from our frontier). This process continues until our frontier is empty (we have considered or pruned
all possible alternate elimination sequences). The value of the running upper bound is the true margin of
victory of the election.
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Its easy to extend our margin-irv algorithm to also calculate MOVC for a set of alternate winners A. In
the first step of the algorithm, rather than adding a node for each alternate winner in C \ {cw} we add then
only for the alternates we are interested in A. The remainder of the algorithm is unchanged.
3 Calculating the Number of Votes to Change a Parliamentary
Election Outcome
Given a set S of seats in a parliament, a winning coalition of parties P is a set of parties such that the
number of seats won by that coalition is at least some defined threshold T . Usually T = ⌈ |S|+1
2
⌉, that is the
coalition wins more than half the seats. In the NSW Legislative Assembly there are 93 seats overall, so 47
are required to win government.
We can use this to calculate the number of vote changes required to change a parliamentary election
result as follows. Assume the coalition won W ≥ T seats. We calculate the MOVC for each seat s won by
the coalition P for the set of alternate candidates in that election of parties different than P . We then sort
the MOVC values, and choose the W − T + 1 seats O with the least MOVC values. The sum of the MOVC
of these seats O is the number of changes in votes required to remove the victory of the winning coalition
P , and hence change the outcome of the election.
Note that if the coalition is a single party P = {p}, or more generally if no seat has two candidates from
the coalition, then the MOVC values required are identical to MOV values. This is the case for the NSW
Legislative Election where no seat has both a LIB and NAT candidate.
We can use a similar approach to calculate the number of vote changes required to change a parliamentary
election outcome so that another coalition P ′ would win instead. Assume P ′ wonW ′ < T seats. We calculate
the MOVC for each seat s not won by coalition P ′ for the set of alternate candidates in that seat with parties
in P ′. We then sort the MOVC values, and choose the W ′ − T seats O′ with the least MOVC values. The
sum of the MOVC of these seats O′ is the number of changes in votes required to give a parliamentary
victory to the coalition P ′.
Again if the coalition P ′ was always the alternate winner in the calculation of the MOV, then the MOVC
and MOV calculations will coincide, and indeed if P ′ is a strong existing coalition it is likely that it is the
alternate winner in most seats with the lowest MOV.
4 Results
The NSW Legislative Assembly Parliamentary Election of 2015 was contested by major parties: Liberal
(LIB), National (NAT), Green (GRE), Labor (ALP) and Country Labor (CLP); as well as a number of
minor parties and independents (IND).
We found 5 seats in which the true margin was not the last-round margin:
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner
Lismore 6 1173 209 NAT
Balina 7 1267 1130 GRE
Heffron 5 5835 5824 ALP
Maitland 6 5446 4012 CLP
Willoughby 6 10247 10160 LIB
The Liberal/National coalition won 54 seats to have a winning majority. In order to lose this majority,
then need to lose 54 − 47 + 1 = 8 seats. Since no seat ran both a Liberal and National candidate, we can
use the MOV values to calculate the number of votes required to lose 8 seats. The 8 LIB/NAT seats with
the lowest MOV are below. Note that for Lismore, the MOV differs substantially from the last-round margin.
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Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner
East Hills 5 189 189 LIB
Lismore 6 1173 209 NAT
Upper Hunter 6 866 866 NAT
Monaro 5 1122 1122 NAT
Coogee 5 1243 1243 LIB
Tweed 5 1291 1291 NAT
Penrith 8 2576 2576 LIB
Holsworthy 6 2902 2902 LIB
Hence he total number of votes required to lose the majority is 10,398.
For the Labor and Country Labor coalition to win the election we need them win to 47− 34 = 13 more
seats. The 13 seats with the lowest MOVC for a change to ALP/CLP are:
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner MOVC (ALP/CLP)
East Hills 5 189 189 LIB 189
Lismore 6 1173 209 NAT 209
Upper Hunter 6 866 866 NAT 866
Monaro 5 1122 1122 NAT 1122
Balina 7 1267 1130 GRE 1130
Coogee 5 1243 1243 LIB 1243
Tweed 5 1291 1291 NAT 1291
Balmain 7 1731 1731 GRE 1731
Penrith 8 2576 2576 LIB 2576
Holsworthy 6 2902 2902 LIB 2902
Goulburn 6 2945 2945 LIB 2945
Oatley 5 3006 3006 LIB 3006
Newtown 7 3536 3536 GRE 3536
The total number of votes required to give an ALP/CLP victory is hence 22,746. In this case we can
see, since the ALP/CLP is a strong alternate coalition, that all the MOVC calculations agree with the
MOV calculations. Note that this is not true for all seats. For example in the NSW data Sydney is the
first seat where the MOVC (= 5583) for the ALP and CLP coalition is different from the MOV (=2864).
This is because the runner-up was an Independent. Note that if we used MOV instead of MOVC we would
incorrectly treat Sydney as one of the seats to change, and incorrectly calculate the number of votes required
for an ALP/CLP coalition to win.
The full results for all seats are in the Appendix. The total numbers for changing the parliamentary
outcome are computed by simply adding together the smallest margins for the necessary number of seats.
5 Conclusion
We have shown an efficient method of automated margin computation that can be used to identify the
minimum number of vote changes (or errors) necessary to alter a parliamentary election outcome using
single-member preferential voting. Our example was the NSW Legislative Assembly election of 2015, but
the same tools and techniques could be immediately applied to any other parliament constructed in the same
way for which full voting data was available, such as the Australian House of Representatives.
All the necessary code is openly available at https://github.com/michelleblom/margin-irv.
Accurate electoral margins can form the basis of rigorous statistical auditing of paper ballot records to
check the official election result. This would be valuable in any scenario, but is particularly important when
an electronic (and hence unobservable) process such as automated ballot scanning is part of the count. Since
these are exactly the scenarios that tend to produce detailed vote data, this work provides the basis for a
count that is automated and fast (because of automated ballot scanning) and also transparent and verifiably
accurate, because of rigorous auditing given an accurately computed election margin.
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A Full list of election margins for NSW 2015 state election
Table 1 records the last-round and true victory margins for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house elections.
In most seats, the last-round margin – the difference between the two last candidates in the elimination
order – is the true margin. Exceptions to this rule are marked with an asterisk. The 8 Liberal/National
coalition seats with the smallest margins are shown in bold. The total of the margins of these 8 seats gives
the smallest number of vote changes required to produce a hung parliament, 10,398.
Table 1: Last-round and true margins for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner
Gosford 6 102 102 ALP
The Entrance 5 171 171 ALP
East Hills 5 189 189 LIB
*Lismore 6 1173 209 NAT
Strathfield 5 770 770 ALP
Granville 6 837 837 ALP
Upper Hunter 6 866 866 NAT
Monaro 5 1122 1122 NAT
*Balina 7 1267 1130 GRE
Coogee 5 1243 1243 LIB
Tweed 5 1291 1291 NAT
Prospect 5 1458 1458 ALP
Balmain 7 1731 1731 GRE
Continued
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Table 1: Last-round and true margins for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner
Rockdale 6 2004 2004 ALP
Port Stephens 5 2088 2088 CLP
Auburn 6 2265 2265 ALP
Penrith 8 2576 2576 LIB
Kogarah 6 2782 2782 ALP
Sydney 8 2864 2864 IND
Holsworthy 6 2902 2902 LIB
Goulburn 6 2945 2945 LIB
Oatley 5 3006 3006 LIB
Campbelltown 5 3096 3096 ALP
Newcastle 7 3132 3132 ALP
Wollongong 7 3367 3367 ALP
Macquarie Fields 7 3519 3519 ALP
Newtown 7 3536 3536 GRE
Heathcote 6 3560 3560 LIB
Blue Mountains 6 3614 3614 ALP
Myall Lakes 6 3627 3627 NAT
Bega 5 3663 3663 LIB
Wyong 7 3720 3720 ALP
Londonderry 5 3736 3736 ALP
Seven Hills 7 3774 3774 LIB
Summer Hill 7 3854 3854 ALP
Kiama 5 3856 3856 LIB
*Maitland 6 5446 4012 CLP
Terrigal 5 4053 4053 LIB
South Coast 5 4054 4054 LIB
Clarence 8 4069 4069 NAT
Lake Macquarie 7 4253 4253 IND
Mulgoa 5 4336 4336 LIB
Oxley 5 4591 4591 NAT
Tamworth 7 4643 4643 NAT
Maroubra 5 4717 4717 ALP
Swansea 8 4974 4974 ALP
Ryde 5 5153 5153 LIB
Barwon 6 5229 5229 NAT
Riverstone 5 5324 5324 LIB
Wagga Wagga 6 5475 5475 LIB
Parramatta 7 5509 5509 LIB
Charlestown 7 5532 5532 ALP
Bankstown 6 5542 5542 ALP
Blacktown 5 5565 5565 ALP
Coffs Harbour 5 5824 5824 NAT
*Heffron 5 5835 5824 ALP
Albury 5 5840 5840 LIB
Miranda 6 5881 5881 LIB
Mount Druitt 5 6343 6343 ALP
Canterbury 5 6610 6610 ALP
Fairfield 5 6998 6998 ALP
Continued
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Table 1: Last-round and true margins for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner
Epping 6 7156 7156 LIB
Bathurst 5 7267 7267 NAT
Hawkesbury 8 7311 7311 LIB
Wollondilly 6 7401 7401 LIB
Shellharbour 7 7519 7519 ALP
Cabramatta 5 7613 7613 ALP
Lane Cove 6 7740 7740 LIB
Drummoyne 6 8099 8099 LIB
Keira 5 8164 8164 ALP
Camden 5 8217 8217 LIB
Lakemba 5 8235 8235 ALP
Liverpool 5 8495 8495 ALP
North Shore 7 8517 8517 NAT
Murray 8 8574 8574 NAT
Hornsby 6 8577 8577 LIB
Dubbo 7 8680 8680 NAT
Port Macquarie 5 8715 8715 NAT
Cessnock 5 9187 9187 CLP
Cootamundra 5 9247 9247 NAT
Wallsend 5 9418 9418 ALP
Cronulla 5 9674 9674 LIB
Vaucluse 5 9783 9783 LIB
Baulkham Hills 5 10023 10023 LIB
Orange 5 10048 10048 NAT
Ku-ring-gai 5 10061 10061 LIB
*Willoughby 6 10247 10160 LIB
Wakehurst 6 10770 10770 LIB
Manly 5 10806 10806 LIB
Pittwater 5 11430 11430 LIB
Northern Tablelands 6 11969 11969 LIB
Davidson 5 12960 12960 LIB
Castle Hill 5 13160 13160 LIB
Table 2 lists the number of vote changes necessary to elect an ALP or CLP candidate. This is at least the
true margin (from the previous table), but may be strictly more, for example if an independent candidate
was the runner-up. The rows inside the double lines are the 10 seats with the smallest changes necessary to
give the labor parties 47 seats. The combined total number of votes needed to produce this is the sum of
those rows: 22746.
Table 2: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP or
CLP candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP or CLP
Auburn 6 2265 2265 ALP 0
Bankstown 6 5542 5542 ALP 0
Continued
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Table 2: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP or
CLP candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP or CLP
Blacktown 5 5565 5565 ALP 0
Blue Mountains 6 3614 3614 ALP 0
Cabramatta 5 7613 7613 ALP 0
Campbelltown 5 3096 3096 ALP 0
Canterbury 5 6610 6610 ALP 0
Cessnock 5 9187 9187 CLP 0
Charlestown 7 5532 5532 ALP 0
Fairfield 5 6998 6998 ALP 0
Gosford 6 102 102 ALP 0
Granville 6 837 837 ALP 0
Heffron 5 5835 5824 ALP 0
Keira 5 8164 8164 ALP 0
Kogarah 6 2782 2782 ALP 0
Lakemba 5 8235 8235 ALP 0
Liverpool 5 8495 8495 ALP 0
Londonderry 5 3736 3736 ALP 0
Macquarie Fields 7 3519 3519 ALP 0
Maitland 6 5446 4012 CLP 0
Maroubra 5 4717 4717 ALP 0
Mount Druitt 5 6343 6343 ALP 0
Newcastle 7 3132 3132 ALP 0
Port Stephens 5 2088 2088 CLP 0
Prospect 5 1458 1458 ALP 0
Rockdale 6 2004 2004 ALP 0
Shellharbour 7 7519 7519 ALP 0
Strathfield 5 770 770 ALP 0
Summer Hill 7 3854 3854 ALP 0
Swansea 8 4974 4974 ALP 0
The Entrance 5 171 171 ALP 0
Wallsend 5 9418 9418 ALP 0
Wollongong 7 3367 3367 ALP 0
Wyong 7 3720 3720 ALP 0
East Hills 5 189 189 LIB 189
Lismore 6 1173 209 NAT 209
Upper Hunter 6 866 866 NAT 866
Monaro 5 1122 1122 NAT 1122
Balina 7 1267 1130 GRE 1130
Coogee 5 1243 1243 LIB 1243
Tweed 5 1291 1291 NAT 1291
Balmain 7 1731 1731 GRE 1731
Penrith 8 2576 2576 LIB 2576
Holsworthy 6 2902 2902 LIB 2902
Goulburn 6 2945 2945 LIB 2945
Oatley 5 3006 3006 LIB 3006
Newtown 7 3536 3536 GRE 3536
Continued
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Table 2: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP or
CLP candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP or CLP
Heathcote 6 3560 3560 LIB 3560
Myall Lakes 6 3627 3627 NAT 3627
Bega 5 3663 3663 LIB 3663
Seven Hills 7 3774 3774 LIB 3774
Kiama 5 3856 3856 LIB 3856
Terrigal 5 4053 4053 LIB 4053
South Coast 5 4054 4054 LIB 4054
Clarence 8 4069 4069 NAT 4069
Lake Macquarie 7 4253 4253 IND 4253
Mulgoa 5 4336 4336 LIB 4336
Oxley 5 4591 4591 NAT 4591
Ryde 5 5153 5153 LIB 5153
Barwon 6 5229 5229 NAT 5229
Riverstone 5 5324 5324 LIB 5324
Wagga Wagga 6 5475 5475 LIB 5475
Parramatta 7 5509 5509 LIB 5509
Sydney 8 2864 2864 IND 5583
Coffs Harbour 5 5824 5824 NAT 5824
Albury 5 5840 5840 LIB 5840
Miranda 6 5881 5881 LIB 5881
Epping 6 7156 7156 LIB 7156
Bathurst 5 7267 7267 NAT 7267
Hawkesbury 8 7311 7311 LIB 7311
Wollondilly 6 7401 7401 LIB 7401
Lane Cove 6 7740 7740 LIB 7740
Drummoyne 6 8099 8099 LIB 8099
Camden 5 8217 8217 LIB 8217
Hornsby 6 8577 8577 LIB 8577
Dubbo 7 8680 8680 NAT 8680
Port Macquarie 5 8715 8715 NAT 8715
North Shore 7 8517 8517 NAT 8798
Cootamundra 5 9247 9247 NAT 9247
Murray 8 8574 8574 NAT 9483
Cronulla 5 9674 9674 LIB 9674
Baulkham Hills 5 10023 10023 LIB 10023
Orange 5 10048 10048 NAT 10048
Ku-ring-gai 5 10061 10061 LIB 10061
Willoughby 6 10247 10160 LIB 10160
Vaucluse 5 9783 9783 LIB 10581
Wakehurst 6 10770 10770 LIB 10770
Tamworth 7 4643 4643 NAT 11283
Northern Tablelands 6 11969 11969 LIB 11969
Manly 5 10806 10806 LIB 12106
Pittwater 5 11430 11430 LIB 12181
Davidson 5 12960 12960 LIB 13065
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Table 2: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP or
CLP candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP or CLP
Castle Hill 5 13160 13160 LIB 13160
Table 3 records the margins for a Labor-Green coalition. In this case the total number of vote changes
required to produce this outcome is 16349.
Table 3: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP, CLP,
or Greens (GRN) candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP, CLP, or GRN
Auburn 6 2265 2265 ALP 0
Balina 7 1267 1130 GRE 0
Balmain 7 1731 1731 GRE 0
Bankstown 6 5542 5542 ALP 0
Blacktown 5 5565 5565 ALP 0
Blue Mountains 6 3614 3614 ALP 0
Cabramatta 5 7613 7613 ALP 0
Campbelltown 5 3096 3096 ALP 0
Canterbury 5 6610 6610 ALP 0
Cessnock 5 9187 9187 CLP 0
Charlestown 7 5532 5532 ALP 0
Fairfield 5 6998 6998 ALP 0
Gosford 6 102 102 ALP 0
Granville 6 837 837 ALP 0
Heffron 5 5835 5824 ALP 0
Keira 5 8164 8164 ALP 0
Kogarah 6 2782 2782 ALP 0
Lakemba 5 8235 8235 ALP 0
Liverpool 5 8495 8495 ALP 0
Londonderry 5 3736 3736 ALP 0
Macquarie Fields 7 3519 3519 ALP 0
Maitland 6 5446 4012 CLP 0
Maroubra 5 4717 4717 ALP 0
Mount Druitt 5 6343 6343 ALP 0
Newcastle 7 3132 3132 ALP 0
Newtown 7 3536 3536 GRE 0
Port Stephens 5 2088 2088 CLP 0
Prospect 5 1458 1458 ALP 0
Rockdale 6 2004 2004 ALP 0
Shellharbour 7 7519 7519 ALP 0
Strathfield 5 770 770 ALP 0
Summer Hill 7 3854 3854 ALP 0
Swansea 8 4974 4974 ALP 0
The Entrance 5 171 171 ALP 0
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Table 3: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP, CLP,
or Greens (GRN) candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP, CLP, or GRN
Wallsend 5 9418 9418 ALP 0
Wollongong 7 3367 3367 ALP 0
Wyong 7 3720 3720 ALP 0
East Hills 5 189 189 LIB 189
Lismore 6 1173 209 NAT 209
Upper Hunter 6 866 866 NAT 866
Monaro 5 1122 1122 NAT 1122
Coogee 5 1243 1243 LIB 1243
Tweed 5 1291 1291 NAT 1291
Penrith 8 2576 2576 LIB 2576
Holsworthy 6 2902 2902 LIB 2902
Goulburn 6 2945 2945 LIB 2945
Oatley 5 3006 3006 LIB 3006
Heathcote 6 3560 3560 LIB 3560
Myall Lakes 6 3627 3627 NAT 3627
Bega 5 3663 3663 LIB 3663
Seven Hills 7 3774 3774 LIB 3774
Kiama 5 3856 3856 LIB 3856
Terrigal 5 4053 4053 LIB 4053
South Coast 5 4054 4054 LIB 4054
Clarence 8 4069 4069 NAT 4069
Lake Macquarie 7 4253 4253 IND 4253
Mulgoa 5 4336 4336 LIB 4336
Oxley 5 4591 4591 NAT 4591
Ryde 5 5153 5153 LIB 5153
Barwon 6 5229 5229 NAT 5229
Riverstone 5 5324 5324 LIB 5324
Wagga Wagga 6 5475 5475 LIB 5475
Parramatta 7 5509 5509 LIB 5509
Sydney 8 2864 2864 IND 5583
Coffs Harbour 5 5824 5824 NAT 5824
Albury 5 5840 5840 LIB 5840
Miranda 6 5881 5881 LIB 5881
Epping 6 7156 7156 LIB 7156
Bathurst 5 7267 7267 NAT 7267
Hawkesbury 8 7311 7311 LIB 7311
Wollondilly 6 7401 7401 LIB 7401
Lane Cove 6 7740 7740 LIB 7740
Drummoyne 6 8099 8099 LIB 8099
Camden 5 8217 8217 LIB 8217
North Shore 7 8517 8517 NAT 8517
Hornsby 6 8577 8577 LIB 8577
Dubbo 7 8680 8680 NAT 8680
Port Macquarie 5 8715 8715 NAT 8715
Cootamundra 5 9247 9247 NAT 9247
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Table 3: Last-round margins, true margins, and the number of vote changes required to elect an ALP, CLP,
or Greens (GRN) candidate for each seat in the 2015 NSW lower house election.
Seat Candidates Last-round margin True margin Winner Changes to Elect
ALP, CLP, or GRN
Murray 8 8574 8574 NAT 9483
Cronulla 5 9674 9674 LIB 9674
Vaucluse 5 9783 9783 LIB 9783
Baulkham Hills 5 10023 10023 LIB 10023
Orange 5 10048 10048 NAT 10048
Ku-ring-gai 5 10061 10061 LIB 10061
Willoughby 6 10247 10160 LIB 10160
Wakehurst 6 10770 10770 LIB 10770
Manly 5 10806 10806 LIB 10806
Tamworth 7 4643 4643 NAT 11283
Pittwater 5 11430 11430 LIB 11430
Northern Tablelands 6 11969 11969 LIB 11969
Davidson 5 12960 12960 LIB 12960
Castle Hill 5 13160 13160 LIB 13160
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